As statistics show that most threats to information security in Internet of Things (IOT) are caused by data leakage, lots of methods have been developed to address the problem of data leakage prevention (DLP). However, most of these methods do not work well when the confidentiality of data changes frequently. We propose an Adaptive Feature Graph Update model (AFGU) to solve the problem by mapping the features of confidential data to the feature graph. First, the feature graph are built to record the features of confidential data which involve the sensitive terms and their context. Then, the improved evaluation method for the importance of each term is employed to update the feature graph according to the importance degree of each term. Finally, the confidentiality of data are determined by matching the features of the data with the feature graph. Experiments results show that the proposed method can detect confidential data effectively and efficiently.
I. INTRODUCTION
Nowadays, billions of sensors are deployed in IOT via Wireless Sensor Networks(WSN) due to the mobility and flexibility of WSN. However,the problem of data leakage in IOT appears and has become more and more serious. As a threat to information security, the data leakage in IOT means the intentional or unintentional disclosures of information. With the advent of information era, people can obtain the information they need form different sources conveniently, especially when wireless network technology has been widely used gradually. And then comes the problem of information security. In 2017, more than 3 billion Yahoo accounts are breached and almost all Yahoo accounts are involved [1] - [3] . In 2018, the private data of more than 87 million Facebook users are leaked, which is the worst data leakage accident ever in the Facebook's history. In fact, accidents like these abound and
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Xiaojiang Du. the security of data has drawn wide attention in every field. According to the IT Risks reports released by Kaspersky Lab in 2016, about 43% of companies have experienced data leakage because of the carelessness of employees, and 80% of businesses regard data protection as the top priority [4] . With the wide application of sensors and the advent of Internet of Things, the information security in IOT has attracted more and more attention. In 2018, according to ZDNet, a new smart sensor mobile device can track Android and iOS devices on the Internet and collect their information when they leave the factory. Any application or web site can access this information without special privileges. In the IOT via WSN, due to the dynamic and self-organizing characteristics of wireless sensor networks, the difficulty of data leakage protection is further increased, which makes it particularly important to fast detect confidential information in transformed data.
Since the IOT via WSN are usually deployed in open environments with cheap small sensors employed, it is difficult to monitor the confidential data leakage from the sensor nodes VOLUME 7, 2019 This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License. For more information, see http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ X. Yu et al.: Graph-Based Adaptive Method for Fast Detection of Transformed Data Leakage in IOT Via WSN of WSN. In WSN, most common nodes are designed to be cheap and do not have enough both hardware and software resources, which means that it is impossible to execute detection on each common node. In this work, our goal is to study the problem of data leakage detection in the IOT via WSN and present a data leakage prevention method which can be deployed on the central aggregator or management nodes. Most today's data leakage events are mainly caused by the insiders according to the statistics. In order to avoid data leakage, the data need to be detected first before being sent out. However, in order to confuse traditional security measures, the confidential data are either embedded into the non-confidential data or rephrased directly, and then pass the confidentiality detection. Although lots of improved measures have been taken to detect the transformed confidential data, data leakage incidents still happen from time to time which is mainly because of lacking the understanding of data semantics. Considering a possible scenario: an employee of an organization wants to leak some confidential data collected in IOT to an unauthorized outsider, he embeds the confidential data into the non-confidential data and rephrases the other confidential data to escape from being detected. Generally, most existing detection methods mainly focus on the sensitive data and ignore the context of the sensitive data, which may lead to low detection accuracy, especially when the sensitive data are rephrased. Some work has been done to improve the detection accuracy of transformed data, however, due to the complexity of data transformation in real situation, most of the work can only deal with simple cases, such as considering several interrelated sensitive data together at a time. Hence, as for DLP in IOT, it is of vital importance to better detect the transformed data [5] .
In this paper, we present AFGU, an data leakage prevention model based on graph fusion, reduction and matching, which can be deployed on the central aggregator and detect transformed Data effectively in IOT via WSN. In AFGU, all the data segments are represented by graphs, and the confidential data, which are equivalent to sensitive terms in confidential documents, are represented as nodes in graph. Whether a document contains sensitive terms or not can be determined by calculating the matching degree between the nodes in the graph and the terms in the document. In view of the diversity of data changes in IOT, in AFGU, different graphs can be fused together or separated from each other according to the specific situation. By calculating the degree of node importance, unimportant nodes can be removed from the graph.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, the previous related work on data leakage prevention are introduced. In section 3, together with the corresponding methods of graph fusion, reduction and Matching, the AFGU model is presented. In section 4, the experiments conducted to evaluate the performance of AFGU on both Reuters and IBRL data sets are discussed. In section 5, we summarize the paper and discuss the directions of our future work.
II. RELATED WORK A. METHODS BASED ON CONTENT ANALYSIS
In view of the increasingly serious damage of data leakage, it is necessary to pay more attention on data leakage prevention. So far, researchers have done a lot of research work on data leakage prevention and made some achievements. However, the research on data leakage prevention is far from sufficient. In DLP, most early research mainly focus on the detection of sensitive terms without considering the related context of the terms. The methods based on content analysis can be further classified into three categories, that is, rulebased methods, fingerprinting related methods and statistical methods.
As to rule-based methods, the documents to be detected are compared with a series of predefined rules, the sensitivity of documents are determined by the matching degree between the documents and the rules. Rule-based methods can detect the documents involving confidential data which are not transformed accurately, however, they fail to detect the documents with transformed data involved. As to fingerprinting related methods, it first calculates the hash value of the training documents in the training phase to build the template for sensitive data. In the detection phase, the hash values of the documents to be detected are calculated and further compared with the hash values of the existing template. Fingerprinting related methods can detect sensitive data fast and accurately, however, similar to rule-based methods, when the document to be detected involves transformed confidential data or new confidential data which never appeared in training documents, its fingerprinting will be different form the template, making it hard to detect. Some related work has been done to improve fingerprinting method, such as replacing overall hash with blocking hash [6] . As to statistical methods, the statistics features of the documents, such as the term frequency(TF), the inverse document frequency(IDF), need to be calculated. And the confidentiality of a document is determined by the statistics features of the document. However, statistics methods might be deceived when quantities of nonsensitive terms are embedded into the document. Although some other statistics methods are proposed to tolerate this transformation, such as n-gram based classification method, it is still hard to identify sensitive terms accurately especially in rephrased documents [7] .
With the development of machine learning, the machine learning methods, which are originally explored for information classification, retrieval and filtering, are employed in the field of data leakage prevention. Although some DLP methods with machine learning technology integrated can detect the confidential data which are not transformed, their performance still suffer from the confidential data which are transformed. In 2011, Hart et al. propose an automatic text classification method based on SVM(support vector machines), which can classify sensitive and non-sensitive text according to term frequency [8] . The support vector clustering algorithm applies the statistics of support vectors, which are developed in the support vector machines, to categorize unlabeled data. In 2016, Xu et al. propose another text classification method based on Naive Bayes [9] . However, neither of them can correctly classify the text involving transformed data, because they might be deceived by the statistical characteristics of transformed data. Therefore, the methods mentioned above are hard to deal with transformed data.
Most information security solutions are proposed to traditional networks [10] - [14] , but the restrictions of IOT via WSN make direct application of these solutions inviable. Huang et al. Present a IDS model for ad-hoc networks, which can select responsible node to monitor each cycle. However, the solution is inadequate to WSNs and too expensive [15] . Hu et al. Pires et al. propose a method for detecting wormhole attacks in ad-hoc networks according to the time spent on packets transmission. However, the method is hard to keep nodes synchronized in WSNs [16] . In 2017, Jing et al. propose an adaptive multi-sensor data fusion method based on deep convolutional neural networks for fault diagnosis [17] . In 2018, Paula et al. propose an IDS that fits the demands and restrictions of WSNs to protect WSNs against some types of attacks [18] . Huan et al. propose an outlier detection algorithm in WSNs, which uses model selection-based support vector data description [19] . However, the proposed methods mainly focus on the initial feature selection, and the changes of selected features are often neglected, which might decrease the accuracy of detection.
In this paper, we propose AFGU, which can be deployed on the central aggregator or management node according to the resources allocated. The data, which is collected from some or all sensor nodes, is mapped to the corresponding nodes of the feature graph to calculate its sensitive score. If the sensitivity score exceeds the predefined threshold, the data is considered to be sensitive.
B. METHODS BASED ON CONTEXT ANALYSIS
For confidential data detection, it is not enough to detect sensitive terms only. To address this problem, some methods based on context analysis have been put forward in recent years. In 2014, Katz et al. proposed CoBAn, which takes the context of sensitive terms into account [20] . CoBAn records the sensitive terms together with their context with a graph structure and has achieved good performance. However, when dealing with transformed data with CoBAn, the definition of sensitive term context seems too rigid. In 2016, Shu et al. propose a improved n-gram method to preserve information for the context of sensitive terms, which compensates the limitations of original n-gram method to a certain extent, but the preserved information is still insufficient when dealing with transformed data [21] . In 2018, Lu et al. propose a fast data leakage detection method based on a weighted context graph model [22] . Currently, although there exist some data leakage prevention methods, which try to accurately represent sensitive terms and their context with graph-based model, none of them take full account of both the changes of sensitive terms and transformed data [23] , [24] .
In this paper, an adaptive feature graph update model, AFGU, is presented to solve the problem of data leakage prevention. In this model, all confidential data(documents) of the same category are represented by a graph, whose nodes consist of the sensitive features(the sensitive terms and their context which are from the documents of the category). Since both the confidential data and documents are composed of various features or terms, in the following paper, we treat data and documents as homogeneous and do not distinguish them any more. The main contributions are as follows.
• In AFGU, the sensitive terms and their context are represented as different nodes in graph, which makes it easy to detect confidential text by matching the possible sensitive terms of the text with the graph of sensitive data template.
• According to the data changes of IOT, the graphs with different topics can fuse together or separate apart as needed no matter there exists common nodes among them or not.
• When the confidentiality changes, AFGU updates the graph of sensitive data template. In the graph, the related nodes/terms of a certain topic can be easily removed when the topic is no longer confidential, conversely, the related nodes/terms of a newly emerging confidential topic can be added to the graph.
III. AFGU MODEL
In this section, the problem formulation of data leakage prevention is presented, and then follows the analysis and our solution in detail. The proposed AFGU consists of three phases: training phase, detection phase and adaptive updating phase.
A. PROBLEM FORMULATION
Due to the serious damage caused by the data leakage from insiders, both intentionally and accidentally, it is necessary to inspect the outgoing documents in advance, and the documents with sensitive data detected should be blocked in time.
As shown in Fig.1 , the outgoing documents are first inspected by DLP Agent, then the documents without sensitive data detected are considered to be safe and allowed to proceed, and the blocked ones are sent to relevant security personnel for further processing. Given a dataset D as a document set, which consists of both confidential documents and non-confidential ones. The training set, D = D C D NC , is a collection of documents whose confidentiality are known, in which D C = {d 1 , d 2 , . . . , d m } denotes the subset of all confidential documents in D and D NC = {d 1 , d 2 , . . . , d n } denotes the subset of all nonconfidential documents in D. Similarly, the test set, D = D C D NC is a collection of documents whose confidentiality are unknown, in which D C and D NC denote the subset of the documents identified as confidential and non-confidential in D respectively. The ith document in a document set is denoted as d i , and the jth term within the ith document is denoted as t ij , where i and j denote the order of each document and each term respectively. Thus, the related definitions are described as follows.
The goal of the paper is to establish a model with the documents in training set D, then the model can be used to identify the documents in test set D as confidential or nonconfidential. If there are confidential documents whose sensitivity scores exceed the predefined threshold θ in the test set D , there exists the possibility of data leakage.
B. TRAINING PHASE 1) DATA PREPROCESSING
In the training phase, we first preprocess the data of both training set and test set in two steps. In the first step, the terms in the documents are normalized, as most stemming algorithms do [15] , the redundant affix or terms in the documents are removed, such as 'the', 'be', 'ed' and 'ing', etc. And then documents are segmented into terms, which might contain one or more words each.
2) THE VECTOR REPRESENTATION OF DOCUMENT
After data preprocessing, the normalized documents are further transformed into the vectors according to VSM(Vector Space Model), which is widely adopted for text representation [16] . Then, each document is represented as
When extracting the representative terms from a document, the frequencies of the terms in the document are generally employed as an important index, which can reflect the sensitivity of a term to a certain extent. As a widely adopted index, the validity of TF-IDF(Term Frequency-Inverse Document Frequency) has already been verified in various fields, such as information retrieval and text mining, etc [17] . The description of TF-IDF is as follows.
where t ik ∈d i n ik denotes the sum of all terms in document d i , n ik denotes the occurrence number of t ik in document i, |D| denotes the total number of documents in D and |{d ∈ D : t ij ∈ d }| denotes the number of documents in which t ij appears.
The weight of each term is calculated by Eq.3. The terms with top K weights in d i are selected as the representative sensitive terms of document d i . Then, the representative sensitive terms, together with part of their context terms, are selected as the nodes of feature graph.
The context of a sensitive term is described as follows, where r denotes the maximum distance between the sensitive term and its context terms. And the context terms of a sensitive term are evaluated by the correlation weights, the context terms whose correlation weights exceed a predefined correlation coefficient η are considered as the nodes in feature graph. The correlation weight of each context term t ik is calculated by Eq.4.
Definition 2 (The Context of a Sensitive Term): C i (t ij ) = {t ik ∈ d i : distance(t ij , t ik ) ≤ r} denotes all context terms of sensitive term t ij whose distance from t ij is less than or equal to r.
where w (t ik |t ij ) denotes the correlation weight of each context term t ik and t ik is the context term of t ij , t ij ∧ t ik denotes the occurrence of both t ij and t ik .
3) BUILDING FEATURE GRAPH FOR DOCUMENTS
In training set, assuming that documents belonging to a certain category consist of confidential documents and nonconfidential ones. Generally, the confidential documents of the same category may contain similar sensitive terms and context terms. To each category, only the confidential documents are taken into account, each confidential document is represented as a feature graph whose nodes are in accordance with the sensitive terms and their context terms involved in the document. When all confidential documents of the same category are represented as graphs, the graphs can be further fused into one graph in which all sensitive information corresponding to the documents of this category are involved. The process of building feature graph for confident documents is described as follows. As shown in Fig.2 , the confidential documents of different category are represented as graphs, and then the sensitive information of all confidential documents in training set are included, this process can be divided into three steps. In the first step, the TF-IDF value of each term in the documents of training set is calculated and then the sensitive terms and their corresponding context terms are obtained according to the TF-IDF value, based on which the weights of sensitive terms and context terms are evaluated. In the second step, first sort the sensitive terms and their context terms of each confidential document according to dictionary order, and then, for each confidential document, its sensitive terms together with their context terms whose weight exceed η are represented as nodes in the feature graph of the document. In the third step, all feature graphs of the documents from the same category are fused together. Just in case that there exist the documents whose sensitive terms never appear in the sensitive terms collection of other documents, when fusing graphs, the first nodes of all graphs are connected together. As shown in Fig.3 , each document is represented as a chain of representative terms, different chains have common nodes only if the documents they represent have same representative terms which are marked as black solid circles. The representative terms of all confidential documents, which are from same category, are connected together, and the first representative term of each document, which is determined by dictionary order, are further connected. The complete algorithm of training phase is shown in algorithm 1 where the parameter K can be determined by experience or by evaluating the experimental results on training set.
C. DETECTION PHASE
In the detection phase, test documents are first transformed into the vectors of documents. In each vector, the terms with top K weights, together with their context terms whose 
for (each d i in D C ) 6: for (each t in d i ) 7: Calculate the TF-IDF value for t 8: Repre_T i ← Select K terms with Top(K ) TF-IDF values from document d i 9:
for (each t i in Repre_T i ) 10: for (all t j ∈ d i and distance(t i , t j ) ≤ r ) 11: { Calculate the TF-IDF value for t i ∧ t j 12: if (the TF-IDF value of t i ∧ t j exceeds η)
13:
Context_T i ← term t j } 14: Nodes ← Sort_by_Order(Repre_T i Context_T i ) 15: Graph ← Built_Graph(Nodes) 16: return Graph weights exceed η, are selected as the representative sensitive terms of the test documents. By matching the selected sensitive terms of a document with the nodes in the fused feature graph, the sensitivity score of the document can be calculated. If the sensitivity score exceeds the predefined threshold θ , the corresponding test document is detected as confidential. The complete algorithm of detection phase is shown in algorithm 2.
D. ADAPTIVE UPDATING PHASE
In reality, it is common that the sensitivity of a document may change over time, and there also exists the common scenario like that some newly emerging documents need to be released, which include confidential contents of new category, might be mistaken for non-confidential. Thus, how
Algorithm 2 Detection Input: D -Test set
Graph -The feature graph θ -The sensitivity threshold Output: D Sensi -The sensitive documents set 1:
return D Sensi to update the sensitive terms timely according to the changes of document confidentiality level is a significant problem. In AFGU, we propose a reduction method based on rough set theory to figure the problem out. The goal of the proposed method is to adjust sensitive terms adaptively according to the importance degree of sensitive terms, which can be calculated by analyzing the changes of the training data.
When the confidentiality of some documents change or some documents, which are of new category and include both confidential documents and non-confidential ones, are added to the training set, it is necessary to adjust the structure of the graph according to the sensitivity changes of the nodes in graph. Suppose the newly emerging documents include some documents of a new category, and the documents of new category is denoted as D * , which is further classified into the collections of confidential documents D * C and nonconfidential documents D * NC respectively. Then, D * C and D * NC are added to the training set in order to adaptively update the structure of feature graph by fusing the graph of D * C . When the documents of a certain category in training set are no longer considered as confidential, some sensitive terms(nodes) in the documents should be removed from the feature graph according to their importance degrees. The importance degree of term t i can be calculated by Eq.5. The complete algorithm of adaptive updating phase is shown in algorithm 3.
where Impt(t i ) denotes the importance degree of term t i , |N (T , D C )| denotes the number of documents in D C which can be correctly identified as confidential by the sensitive terms set T , and |D C | denotes the number of documents in D C .
E. COMPLEXITY ANALYSIS
The AFGU mainly consists of three phases: the training phase, the detection phase and the adaptive updating phase.
In the training phase, it is not necessary to train the model of feature graph in real-time, which can be asynchronously built Algorithm 3 Adaptive Updating Input: D * -The set of newly emerging documents Graph -The feature graph µ -The importance degree threshold Output: Graph -The updated feature graph 1: if(∃ D * ) 2:
Graph ← Graph G * 5:
for (each t i in Graph) 8: { Calculate the importance degree Impt(t i ) for t i 9:
If (Impt(t i ) ≤ µ)
10:
Node Rm ← Node Rm t i } 11:
Graph ← Graph \ Node Rm
12:
return Graph off-line. However, in the detection phase, the requirement of real-time is particularly important. As to the adaptive updating phase, it can also be executed off-line, and the complexity of this phase is much less than the former two. Therefore, we analyze the complexity of the three phases respectively.
• The training phase: Assume that the weighted feature graph G of training data is built and stored in a hash table.
Generally, the cost of matching a value in hash table is O (1) . Assuming the average length of a document d is m, which is represented by the average number of terms in d, the top K sensitive terms are selected from all the m terms. To a training set whose size is n, in the training phase, the TF-IDF values of the terms in each document are calculated at the cost of O(m * n), the complexity of calculating the weights of the context terms of together with their corresponding sensitive terms is O(n * K * 2 * r), where 2 * r represents the number of context terms in the neighborhood of each sensitive term, and the selected terms are sorted by order and connected at the cost of O(n * K * 2 * r). Thus, the overall complexity of the training phase is O(m * n+n * K * 2 * r +n * K * 2 * r). Since there always exists K * 2 * r < m, the overall complexity can be simplified to O(nm).
• The detection phase: The complexity of calculating TF-IDF value of a document is O(m), and the sensitive terms and their context terms are calculated and sorted by order at the cost of O(K * 2 * r + K * 2 * r). By matching to the feature graph, the document can be identified as confidential or non-confidential, and the complexity of this step is O(n * K * 2 * r) in the worst case. Thus, the overall complexity of the detection phase is O(m + K * 2 * r + K * 2 * r + n * K * 2 * r), which can be simplified to O(m + n).
• The adaptive updating phase: When there exist C newly emerging documents or C documents whose confidentiality have changed, it is necessary to add nodes to or remove nodes from the feature graph according to their importance degrees. The complexity of calculating the importance degrees of the sensitive terms is O(C * K * 2 * r), and the corresponding nodes in the feature graph are further processed according to their importance degrees at the maximum possible cost of O(C * K * 2 * r). Thus,the overall complexity of the adaptive updating phase is O(C * K * 2 * r +C * K * 2 * r), which can be simplified to O(C).
IV. EXPERIMENTS A. THE DATASET
In this paper, we conduct the experiments on a machine with Core i7 CPU, 16GB of memory, 500G of hard disk storage. The performance of AFGU is evaluated based on Reuters-21578 dataset, which consists of 21578 pieces of news distributed by Reuters in 1987. All the news are manually classified into five categories and saved in 22 files. In addition, the news in each category can be further classified into different relevant subcategories, for instance, there exist several relevant subcategories, such as gold, inventory and money-supply, etc., in the economy category. Since the data from similar subcategories might have more identical representative terms and corresponding context terms, which increases the difficulty in identifying sensitive data. Thus, we select the experimental data, most of which are of the same category and from different subcategories, to evaluate the experimental results more convincingly and accurately.
In the experiments, we use θ = C * K /r instead of a fixed threshold to determine the final sensitivity of a document, where C represents a constant derived from the training phase.
In order to verify the feasibility of the method in sensor environment, we also evaluate our method on the IBRL dataset, which is collected from 54 sensors deployed in the Intel Berkeley Research lab. The features of the data in IRBL include time stamped topology information, along with humidity, temperature, etc. In our experiment, the outlier data in IBRL are set to be ''confidential''.
B. THE BASELINE METHODS
In this paper, we compare the performance of AFGU with two baseline methods. (1)Support Vector Machine(SVM), has been proved to be an excellent classifier with high accuracy, which takes into account the minimization of both empirical risk and structural risk. Since SVM with polynomial kernel performs well in text categorization, it is generally selected as the baseline method for evaluation. (2)Contextbased model(CoBAn), which performs well in the detection of sensitive data even if the sensitive data have been rephrased a lot.
C. THE EVALUATION
In this paper, false alarm rate(FAR), detection rate(DR) and run time are selected as the evaluation indexes, which are effectively and widely employed for the experiments of data leakage prevention. As the confusion matrix described in Table 1 , true positive(TP) denotes the number of the documents which include sensitive data and are correctly identified as confidential, false positive(FP) denotes the number of the documents which do not include sensitive data and are mistaken for confidential, true negative(TN) denotes the number of the documents which do not include sensitive data and are correctly identified as non-confidential and false negative(FN) denotes the number of the documents which include sensitive data and are mistaken for non-confidential. Based on the indexes in the confusion matrix, the false alarm rate and detection rate can be further calculated by Eq.6 and Eq.7.
False Alarm Rate = FP FP + TN
D. DETECTING ORIGINAL DATA When detecting original data leakage, the AFGU model is built on the basis of the data in training set, in which the features of confidential contents are recorded. In this scenario, 8000 training documents together with 2000 testing documents are extracted from the five different categories.
As the ROC curves shown in Fig.4 , our goal is to maximize detection rate and minimize false alarm rate concurrently. When detecting sensitive contents in original data, the statistical results show that all the three methods perform well, the performance of SVM, CoBAn and AFGU has no much difference. This is mainly because the core contents of the documents can be clearly represented by the sensitive terms. Although having the similar performance of DR and FAR, as shown in Fig.5 , AFGU and CoBAn are more efficient than SVM, which can be explained as that only the representative terms are considered as nodes in AFGU and CoBAn which are far less than the features considered in SVM, and that further leads to low computational effort.
E. DETECTING REPHRASED DATA
When detecting rephrased data leakage, the AFGU model is built on the basis of the data in training set, in which the sensitive terms together with their context terms are all taken into account. In this scenario, 8000 training documents and 2000 testing documents are extracted from the five different categories as the training set and test set respectively. In the test set, the sensitive terms involved in the confidential documents are rephrased in order to verify the ability of AFGU in detecting transformed data. As the results shown in Fig.6 , the performance of SVM deteriorates greatly due to its statistics nature. Compared to SVM, CoBAn and AFGU can detect the confidential documents with transformed data involved effectively and provide higher detection rate and lower false alarm rate than SVM.
When processing the rephrased data features, SVM depends on the statistics nature of all terms instead of the sensitive terms involved. Other than SVM, CoBAn and AFGU still only take the representative terms into account, which leads to low computational effort. As the results of run time comparison shown in Fig.7 , CoBAn and AFGU are more efficient than SVM.
F. DETECTING REPHRASED DATA AFTER UPDATING
In this scenario, 8000 training documents and 2000 testing documents are first extracted from the four different categories as the training set and test set, and the AFGU model is first built based on the data in training set. In order to simulate the newly emerging data from the sensors in IOT via WSN, another 1000 documents from the fifth category are added to the training set and test set in a ratio of 4 to 1. In addition, the confidential documents, which are from one of the first four categories are considered as non-confidential to simulate the confidentiality changes of data.
As shown in Fig.8 , the performance of SVM cannot detect the confidential documents effectively due to its statistics nature, no matter there exist confidentiality changes or newly emerging data. Other than SVM, CoBAn and AFGU can detect the confidential documents with transformed data involved effectively. When there exist newly emerging data, the performance of CoBAn and AFGU are similar, both of them can detect the documents with sensitive data involved due to their abilities of processing incremental data. However, AFGU performs better than CoBAn when the confidentiality of some documents changes, and it can be explained as that the redundant nodes in feature graph are removed according to the calculation of importance degree which further improves the performance of AFGU.
G. COMPARISON OF DIFFERENT CONTEXT RANGES
Since the number of context terms considered is determined by the maximum distance r between the sensitive term and its context terms. In this experiment, the influence of different r values is discussed according to the DR, FAR and run time of AFGU.
As shown in Fig.9 and Fig.10 , with the increase of r, more context terms are taken into account which leads to the situation that more sensitive terms are involved to a certain document. At first, the detection rate increases with the increase of sensitive terms and the false alarm rate keeps low, the run time increases approximately in a linear manner. When r exceeds a certain value, the detection rate decreases and the false alarm rate increases significantly, however, the run time increases continually. It can be explained as that more nodes are added to the graph with the increase of r, which leads to high computational effort. In addition, more context terms leads to more sensitive nodes in graph, which increases the possibility of non-confidential documents being identified as confidential ones. 
H. EXPERIMENT IN IOT VIA WSN
In this scenario, we also evaluate our method on the IBRL dataset to verify the feasibility of the method in sensor environment, and the outlier data in IBRL are considered as ''confidential''. As shown in Fig.11 , all the three methods deployed on central aggregator can perform feasibly in IOT via WSN at an acceptable run time level, and AFGU outperforms the other two methods.
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
Although some data leakage prevention methods based on graph structure have been proposed to this day, very few of them can update graph structure to adapt to the changes in confidentiality, which is necessary for the sensors in the IOT via WSN. In this paper, we propose a new data leakage prevention method based on feature graph fusion, reduction and matching which is applicable for the information security in IOT via WSN, and the advantages of the method are as follows:
1) Compared to insensitive terms, the proportion of sensitive terms and their context terms is relatively small. Then, it is of high efficiency not only in building feature graphs for the sensitive terms and their context terms but also in fusing the feature graphs of different categories. 2) When the feature graph is built, the sensitivity score of a document can be easily calculated by matching the representative terms of the document to be detected with the corresponding nodes in feature graph. 3) If any confidentiality changes happen or there exist some newly emerging documents, the feature graph can be updated by removing the corresponding nodes generated from the documents that are no longer confidential or by adding the representative terms of the newly emerging documents which are considered as confidential. Since the confidentiality of sensor data in IOT might changes, it is necessary to adaptively update feature graph. Actually, the newly emerging confidential contents which have not been recorded in feature graph, still threaten the security of confidential data. More than that, improving the efficiency of graph fusion and node reduction is still a problem needs to be solved. Hence, our future work will focus on improving the efficiency and effectiveness of AFGU when there exist newly emerging data with sensitive contents involved or the data of certain category whose confidentiality changes.
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